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TOURO LAW REVIEW
SUPREME COURT
RICHMOND COUNTY
People v. Grasso 80
(decided June 17, 1994)
The defendant claimed that his right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment under both the State81 and Federal82
Constitutions was violated after being required to serve a twenty
year to life prison sentence 83 in New York before serving a death
sentence for an Oklahoma murder conviction. 84 The Supreme
Court of Richmond County held that the defendant would not be
permitted to withdraw his previous guilty plea or have his
sentence suspended in order to serve the Oklahoma death
sentence. 85 In denying the defendant's constitutional claim, the
court employed an analysis that focused upon preserving the
integrity of the court's sentencing process and the importance of
upholding the state's distinct policy regarding the death
penalty. 86
80. 162 Misc. 2d 84, 616 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County
1994). Thomas Grasso was deported to Oklahoma on January 11, 1995 and
was subsequently executed on March 20, 1995.
81. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5. This provision states in pertinent part:
"Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted .... " Id.
82. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. This amendment provides: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." Id.
83. Grasso, 162 Misc. 2d at 85, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 157. The defendant
plead guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to twenty years to
life. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 86, 90, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 158, 160.
86. Id. at 87, 89, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 158, 160. The court stated that if it
were to proceed with re-sentencing "[o]nly [the] defendant's interests, not the
interests of justice, would be served." Id. at 89, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 160. The
"defendant would have a justice in a state where the death penalty does not
exist set aside its sentence in order to facilitate a death sentence in another
jurisdiction." Id. The court noted, without passing judgment on Oklahoma's
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The defendant plead guilty to second degree murder and was
sentenced to twenty years to life in prison for the brutal murder
of an elderly man during a robbery he orchestrated. 87 After
incarceration in a New York prison, the defendant was
transferred to Oklahoma to stand trial for another murder
charge. 8 8 Following the transfer, the defendant plead guilty to
the Oklahoma murder charge and consented to his execution in
accordance with Oklahoma law. 8 9 In order for Oklahoma to
enforce its conviction before defendant began his New York
sentence, the State of Oklahoma had to obtain a waiver from
New York releasing the defendant to its custody or to seek a
commutation of the defendant's sentence from the Governor of
New York. 90 When this request was made to the State of New
York, Governor Mario Cuomo denied Oklahoma's request to
preempt the defendant's New York conviction and declined to
commute the defendant's New York sentence. 9 1
death penalty, "[tihe dichotomy between New York and Oklahoma's public
policy regarding the death penalty is acutely apparent." Id.
87. Id. at 89, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 159. The victim was found in a kneeling
position with severe head and facial injuries sustained when the defendant
stomped the victim and choked him with an electrical cord because the victim
put his hands together as if he intended to pray. Id. at 88-89, 616 N.Y.S.2d at
159.
88. Id. at 85, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 157. Defendant was transferred pursuant to
§ 580.20 of the New York Criminal Procedural Law, which, in article I,
provides that an individual may be transferred to "'encourage the expeditious
and orderly disposition of such [criminal] charges and determination of the
proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments,
informations or complaints.'" Id. at 88, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 159 (citing N.Y.
CriM. PRoc. LAw § 580.20 (McKinney 1994)).
89. Grasso, 162 Misc. 2d at 85, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
90. Id. The Grasso court discussed the custodial aspect of article V of
§ 580.20 of the New York Criminal Procedural Law and stated that the
defendant was transferred pursuant to the statute and that Oklahoma only
retains "temporary" custody of the defendant and "[a]t the earliest practicable
time consonant... the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state." Id. at
88, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 159 (citing N.Y. CRZI. PROC. LAV § 580.20 (McKinney
1994)).
91. Id. at 85, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 157. The action by Governor Cuomo
denying the defendant's request was not addressed by the court since the
defendant never raised a claim against Governor Cuomo's decision. Id.
1995]
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As a result, the defendant moved to set aside his New York
sentence and requested that the sentence either run concurrently
with or after the Oklahoma sentence. 92 The defendant sought
support for his motion by contending that by serving the New
York sentence prior to the Oklahoma sentence, he would be
subjected to "cruel and unusual punishment" and that any
rehabilitative efforts would be "de minimus."9 3 The defendant
contended that he should be permitted to serve Oklahoma's
sentence over New York's sentence in order to avoid being idle
in a New York prison for twenty years only then to be executed
upon his return to Oklahoma. 94
Although the court did not address this claim, the court did state that the
power to refuse such a request "is clearly a function within the province of the
executive branch." Id. See N.Y. CONST. art IV, § 4 ("The governor shall have
the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction, for
all offenses .... ") (emphasis added); see also People ex rel. Page v. Brophy,
248 A.D. 309, 310-11, 289 N.Y.S. 362, 364 (4th Dep't 1936) (stating that the
Governor has unlimited power to initiate "reprieves, commutations, and
pardons" as he deems proper and that this authority is not limited by decisional
law or statute).
92. Grasso, 162 Misc. 2d at 85, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 157. This motion by
defendant was made pursuant to § 440.20 of the N.Y. Criminal Procedural
Law, which provides that a sentence may be set aside if it is "unauthorized,
illegally imposed or otherwise invalid as a matter of law." N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 440.20 (McKinney 1994).
93. Grasso, 162 Misc. 2d at 85, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 157. The Grasso court
also focused on another argument, not raised by the defendant, pertaining to
the tremendous expense that would be realized by New York for confining the
defendant to prison for twenty years only to later release him to Oklahoma to
be sentenced to death, a topic hotly debated within the public when the case
first emerged. Id. at 86, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
94. Id. at 85, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 157. The Grasso court addressed this
contention by the defendant with little sympathy and looked upon this
contention as "[a] curious anomaly." Id. at 88, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 159. The
court cited the defendant's pleading in which he stated that he would have to
'endure' New York's twenty year minimum sentence and that his reference to
"'harshness,' 'severe punishment,' and 'cruel and .unusual punishment' ring
hollow in light of the harsh, cruel and severe crime [the defendant] inflicted on
[the victim]." Id. at 89, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 159. The court continued on to state
that "[n]o mercy was shown the victim, no mercy will be shown the killer."
Id.
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The Grasso court concluded that the defendant's consecutive
sentences could not be considered cruel and unusual. 95 In its
conclusion, the Grasso court noted People ex rel. Emanuel v.
Quinn,96 in which a New York court held that once a conviction
has been handed down, any "change in the law does not interfere
with the execution of the sentence." 97 Thus, according to Quinn,
once an individual has been tried and incarcerated, a statutory
amendment will not be applied in favor of the convicted
offender. 98 Also, the Grasso court sought support from People v.
Boatwright,99 which held that the defendant had "no cause to
complain that [his sentence] was unduly harsh or excessive" since
it was within legal sentencing guidelines and because the sentence
was negotiated by the defendant. 100 In Grasso, the defendant was
similarly situated as the defendant in Boativright because he also
plead guilty to his murder charges and was well aware of the
result of such actions.
The Grasso court then addressed a matter of considerable
importance; the affect that a decision in favor of the defendant
would have on sentencing procedures within New York101 and
the affect that such a decision would have on the sanctity of New
York law. 102 The court stated that "[a] sentencing proceeding
inherently proper and legal when imposed cannot be rendered
95. Id. at 86-87, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
96. 66 A.D.2d 905, 411 N.Y.S.2d 696 (2d Dep't 1978). The petitioner
was convicted on various charges and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Id.
at 905, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 697. The petitioner's prison sentence did not specify
a minimum sentence so the parole board instituted a minimum sentence of five
years. Id. Following his conviction, New York State passed a statute allowing
an individual who served jail time prior to the commencement of a conviction
to credit the post-conviction prison sentence with the prior time served. Id.
The petitioner claimed that his pre-conviction jail time should be credited to
his post-conviction prison term. Id. at 906, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 159 A.D.2d 510, 552 N.Y.S.2d 379 (2d Dep't 1990). In Boavright,
the defendant was convicted of the sale of a controlled substance and sentenced
to five to fifteen years in prison. Id.
100. Id. at 511, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
101. Grasso, 162 Misc. 2d at 87, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
102. Id.
19951 767
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legally insufficient because of the imposition of another state's
sentence." ' 103 The court continued to uphold its sentence by
indicating that state sovereignty and public policy must be
absolute and not be affected by any laws of another state. 104 The
court emphasized that the strength in our sentencing guidelines is
not rooted by the influence of "public opinion or political
preferences" but rather in the "wise and considered decisions of
the legislature" mandated by the New York State Constitution. 105
In State of New York by Coughlin v. Poe,106 the Eastern
District of Oklahoma responded to a declaratory judgment action
by the State of New York seeking a determination of its rights
and responsibilities under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
following the request of the defendant Grasso to remain in
Oklahoma to serve his death sentence.107 The Coughlin court
concluded that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act did not
prevent states that have adopted similar statutes from waiving
their rights under the Act and entering into an agreement with
another state regarding the status of a defendant. 108 The court in
Coughlin refused to override the legislative purpose of the
statute. 109 Accordingly, although Oklahoma and New York could
have made an agreement to waive New York's right to the
mandatory return of the defendant, the Grasso court considered
this issue "moot" since Governor Cuomo exercised his right to
refuse commutation of the defendant's sentence. 110
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 835 F. Supp 585 (E.D. Okla. 1993).
107. Id. at 592.
108. Id. at 592-93.
109. Id. at 593.
Although there may be a plethora of persuasive and redeeming
arguments for a mechanism whereby a prisoner receiving the death
penalty need not serve out an existing term sentence prior, to the
execution of his death sentence, this court is not at liberty to substitute
its judgment for the collective wisdom of the legislature.
Id.
110. Grasso, 162 Misc. 2d at 88, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
768 [Vol 11
5
et al.: Cruel & Unusual Punishment
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Perhaps the most significant reasoning expounded by the court
relates in part to the underlying outcome that a decision in favor
of the defendant would present. The court explicitly concluded
that by allowing the defendant's constitutional claim to prevail,
the court would violate the state's distinct policy against state
facilitated suicide and the state's plain policy relating to the death
penalty. 111 By advocating such a practice New York would in
essence be adopting a contrary policy favoring the death penalty.
In determining whether the sentence imposed on the defendant
by New York was in violation of the defendant's state and federal
constitutional rights, the court addressed the issue of whether the
twenty year to life sentence constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. In adopting the reasoning set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Harmelin v. Michigan,112 the court held
that the although the defendant was required to serve both
sentences, serving the New York and Oklahoma sentences
consecutively did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 113
In Harmelin, the Court rejected the' petitioner's claims that the
sentence imposed was "disproportionate" to the crime for which
he was convicted, holding that the mandatory sentence left no
judicial discretion that could have influenced the length of the
sentence.1 14 The Harmelin Court reasoned that "[slevere,
mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the
constitutional sense, having been employed in various forms
111. Id. at 89, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 160. The court stated that if "re-sentencing
[were] permitted the court would be jusfifying a violation of this state's public
policy on facilitating suicide and the imposition of the death penalty by relying
upon the accepted policy in Oklahoma." Id.
112. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). The "[p]etitioner was convicted of possessing
672 grams of cocaine and sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison
without possibility of parole." Id. at 961. The petitioner claimed that the
mandatory life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibiting cruel and unusual punisbment. Id. The Court rejected
the petitioners claim. Id. at 996.
113. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95.
114. Id. at 961-62, 996.
19951 769
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throughout our Nation's history." 115 In addition, the Court also
stated that the purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment was not to prevent legislatures
from implementing disproportionate sentences, but rather to
prevent the legislature from authorizing methods of punishment
contrary to customary methods. 116 Moreover, the Court rejected
the petitioner's claim that his sentence was disproportionate to his
crime because every state is entitled to treat certain acts in the-
manner they deem most appropriate. 117 Although the Court
upheld the petitioner's conviction, the Court did not render all
penalties under our current criminal procedure system as coherent
with the Eighth Amendment. 118 The Court separated a death
sentence from all other penalties due to its extreme nature. The
Court reasoned that a death sentence is different from other
penalties because of its irrevocable nature and when such a
sentence is imposed, review is necessary. 119
Both the New York State and federal courts have adhered to
strict compliance of the right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. Nevertheless, the federal courts have decided to
leave state sentencing procedures to the sole discretion of the
state legislatures and impart to them the power to develop their
own sentencing guidelines. In summary, both jurisdictions have
rendered twenty year to life sentences and death sentences
consonant with the right to be free from cruel and unusual
115. Id. at 994-95. The court characterized "unusual" punishment as "cruel
methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed." Id. at
976.
116. Id. at 975-85.
117. Id. at 989. The Court stated that "[t]he Eighth Amendment is not a
ratchet, whereby a temporary consensus on leniency for a particular crime
fixes a permanent constitutional maximum, disabling the States from giving
effect to altered beliefs and responding to changed social conditions." Id. at
990.
118. Id. at 995.
119. Id. at 995 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
770 [Vol I11
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punishment, although the Supreme Court dictates that a death
sentence does mandate certain constitutional protections. 12 0
120. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982).
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